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Robert Cummings Neville, Behind the Masks of God: An Essay Toward 
Comparative Theology. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1991, 200 pp. Paper US$14.95. 
In a forthcoming book Neville describes Behind the Masks of  God as "a 
study of methodological questions in comparative theology. The book 
argues that comparative categories need to be developed carefully by 
abstracting and purifying motifs from concrete religious traditions and 
inquiring into how well they can be used to interpret other religions. The 
comparative categories of creation ex nihilo and of personal sanctification 
or individuation are explored in that book with reference to Christianity 
and Confusianism, with some reference to Buddhism and Taoism." 
This is a sober and accurate statement of the book's scope. He uses a 
very powerful, because very abstract, notion of creation ex nihilo. His first 
assertion seems innocuous enough. "Anything determinate is contingent 
and hence needs a creator to be" (p. 90). Then we learn that "this ontologi- 
cal contingency applies to anything determinate, from physical things to 
moral laws, to logic, to metaphysical conditions" (p. 91). This includes 
most conceptions of God as well. God, conceived as perfect being or as 
omnipotent lord, is a determinate being requiring creation. If everything 
determinate is contingent, the creator must be utterly indeterminate apart 
from creating. Like Tillich's ground of being, God is not a being but the 
source of all being. 
Many hold creation ex nihilo to be unintelligible. They may assume that 
such intelligibility consists in seeing how things can be explained as 
illustrations of fundamental principles. The absolutely first principles 
cannot be explained, for everything is explained in terms of them. In 
contrast, Neville's approach for a proper explanation is to locate the 
conditions from which things arise. If so, ultimate intelligibility for how 
determinateness as such arises could only be located in a radically indeter- 
minate nothingness capable of creating it. 
A more complete account of the logic of creation ex nihilo involves 
conditional and essential features. Fortunately Neville includes a good 
short exposition of this theory (pp. 89-98). 
Traditionally the God of western theism has been pictured as wholly 
perfect and self-sufficient, who needs no world, yet nevertheless creates it. 
If, however, the creator is nothing apart from creation,"the concept can be 
specified by the creation stories in Hinduism, and by the dynamic relation 
between Nirguna Brahman and Saguna Brahman. It makes good sense 
when specified in Taoism by the relation between the Too that cannot be 
named and the Too that can. And it finds straightforward Neo-Confucian 
expression in Chou Tun-i's progression from Non-being to the Great 
Ultimate, to yang, to yin, the five elements, to the Ten Thousand Things" 
(p. 100). Even though Buddhism is more problematic, "the contingency of 
form on emptiness and samsara on nirvana is contingency upon a creative 
ground" such as creation ex nihilo supplies (p. 101). 
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The question of Buddhism is particularly difficult, and not only because 
there are so many different schools of Buddhist thought. It may be 
questioned whether any ontological interpretation is appropriate. Ex- 
perience is interpreted into something like Hume's sense impressions, 
whose origin comes from "I know not where." Because the effort proved 
so fruitless in times past, most Buddhists refuse to speculate about the 
ontological ground of "emptiness," beyond its connection with "dependent 
co-origination." 
Neville writes: "I submit as an hypothesis for further investigation that 
Buddhists could reinterpret their classic expressions" in his ontological 
terms (pp. 100 f.). Most Buddhists appear to resist interpreting their 
notions ontologically, but if their notions were so interpreted, as the Kyoto 
school has done, many illuminating similarities with creation ex nihilo 
could emerge. There could also be striking parallels with John Cobb's 
process conceptuality as expressed in Beyond Dialogue (Fortress Press, 
1982), which seeks to overcome substantial endurance. 
Ironically, this purified notion of creation ex nihilo may fit non-theistic 
traditions better than theistic ones, insofar as these require divinity to be 
conceived as essentially individual and personal. Since for Neville the 
creator is nothing apart from creation, for "its character as ground is a 
condition resulting from creation, the question of theism or non-theism is a 
secondary issue, depending on different interpretations of the world and 
perhaps genuinely different experiences" (p, 96). 
If it is a secondary issue, then differing traditions interpret the same 
basic ultimate phenomena either theistically as an individual Creator or 
non-theistically as a non-individual pervasive creativity we and perhaps all 
things participate in. Essentially, however, the creator is ultimately an 
indeterminate nothingness which is also the source of being. This nothing- 
ness can be essentially identified with non-individual creativity, but not 
with an individual creator. Yet one of the central tasks of the creator for 
Neville is to determine which metaphysical alternative the world shall 
exemplify. It would take a centered individual contemplating the alterna- 
tives to make this decision. 
Methodologically, Neville's comparative enterprise depends upon 
holding a suitably vague concept of creation ex nihilo. He has a very 
precise notion of what is vague. "First, the [vague] concept must be made 
more specific before it applies to a concrete phenomenon such as a 
particular expression of religious tradition. Second, various specifications 
of the vague concepts can be incompatible with one another and still 
equally well specify the vague concept to different phenomena" (p. 99). 
Other terms receive fresh meaning. Thus to spread the gospel in New 
Testament times means "to think out the meaning of Christian existence in 
a non-Christian context" (p. 31). From that perspective Behind the Masks 
of God is preeminently a work in evangelical theology. 
Sometimes the comparative endeavour reaches dead ends. Kenosis, the 
self-emptying of Christ (Phil. 2:7), would seem to have important af- 
finities with the Buddhist concern for "emptiness". While there may be 
rich psychological and personal parallels, it turns out not to be very 
helpful for ontology. 
Heretofore Neville's philosophy has shown considerable affinity with 
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Whitehead's account of the world, since this seems to be the cosmology 
the creator has determined upon. Yet there are also strong affinities with 
respect to its doctrine of divinity. Whitehead conceives concrescence as an 
act of becoming in which the actuality creates itself. Applied to God, this 
would be the way God determines the divine character by creating. Both 
reject any notion of a determinate God apart from, or before creation. 
Neville gives a very illuminating account of Whitehead as situated 
between positivistic science and its romantic reaction (pp. 59 ff.). The 
primary difference is that while Neville permits only one creator, 
Whitehead has many instances of self-creation. The key issue here turns 
on whether human freedom should be understood as created spontaneity or 
as creative activity. 
Religious studies have experienced a massive transformation in the past 
thirty years or more. There is now an abundance of descriptive and 
analytic material on the various religious traditions. Some have proposed 
impressive world theologies. In contrast, the discipline of the philosophy 
of religion remains almost as parochial in its pre-occupation with the 
Western tradition as it always has been. Given this situation and his 
particular skills, Neville should be encouraged to try his hand at an 
introductory philosophy of religion within the context of world theology. 
Lewis S. Ford 
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 23529-0083 
Richard M. Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, 422 pp. US$44.50. 
Hume's Philo is ubiquitous in Richard Gale's critique of contemporary 
analytic philosophy of religion. Gale has written a cogent and critical 
response to the recent attempts by analytic philosophers, such as Alvin 
Plantinga, William Alston, Robert Adams, and Richard Swinburne, to 
shore up the case for theism. Sympathetic and good willed, yet skeptical, 
Gale takes on a battery of arguments dealing with the nature and existence 
of God and shows their strengths and weaknesses. Confining himself to 
two kinds of arguments regarding the justification of belief in God: 
epistemological arguments, such as the cosmological and ontological 
arguments; and pragmatic arguments, providing prudential and moral 
justification for belief in God; Gale argues that neither are satisfactory, so 
that "if the only available arguments were the epistemological and prag- 
matic arguments examined .... faith would lack any rational justification." 
Nevertheless, a fideistic Gale - in the spirit of Hume? - has the last word. 
"Such [a skeptical] outcome would be welcomed by a wide range of 
Kierkegaardian types who completely eschew any attempt to give an 
"objective" justification of faith. I resonate to their view of faith as a 
subjective passion that outstrips our reason" (p. 387, [but compare the 
closing passage of Hume's essay on "Miracles," "Mere reason is insuffi- 
cient to convince us of [the Christian religion's] veracity. And whoever is 
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moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his 
own person which subverts all the principles of his understanding..."]). 
The book consists of three parts, not entirely obvious from the table of 
contents. (1) Chapters I-5 consist of an analysis of several Atheological 
Arguments, arguments which attempt to derive a contradiction from 
various properties connected with the concept of God. (2) Chapters 6-8 
contains a critical examination of three arguments for the existence of 
God: the Ontological Argument; the Cosmological Argument; and the 
Argument from Religious Experience. (3) Finally, Chapter 9 is an up- 
dated version of his 1980 APQ article, "William James and the Ethics of 
Belief," in which Gale scrutinizes pragmatic justification for belief in God. 
All three parts contain rich material. In (1) Gale uses the atheological 
arguments to arrive at a more adequate notion of God, one which gives up 
the notions of simplicity and immutability, as well as timeless eternity 
(accepting the more Biblical notion of omnitemporality). The fourth 
chapter, on the problem of evil, is the best in the book, perhaps the clearest 
overall discussion of the current debate on the problem of evil, though I 
don't think his negative conclusion is as strong as Gale does (oddly 
enough, Gale admits that Process Theology could be a way out of his main 
criticism). 
The three chapters of the second part (on the deductive theological 
arguments) are well done. Again his discussions of the current debates 
over the Ontological and Cosmological Arguments are the clearest I've 
seen. Anyone working in these areas will have to take Gale' criticisms into 
consideration. Similarly, his chapter on the Arguments from Religious 
Experience, in which he argues persuasively for the disanalogy between 
sensory experience and religious experience, deserves close attention. 
The final topic, Pragmatic Arguments (chapter 9), is treated with the 
same care and cogency as the preceding. After a sharp, telling attack on 
Pascal's Wager Argument, Gale dismisses Clifford's act-utilitarian ethics 
of belief as misguided, but then mounts a deontological attack on James's 
Will to Believe. Basing his argument on the fact that persons have 
Absolute (or very high) worth (it is unclear to me whence in Gale' s system 
this worth derives) and that acting on reasons is intrinsic to personhood, 
Gale mounts an argument against believing for non-epistemic reasons (i.e., 
for pragmatic reasons). In the end, he argues that it is not fair for someone 
to use volitional means to become moral. "Why should the more highly 
principled person ... be morally penalized [by not being allowed to obtain 
a self-induced belief in God in order to be more moral]?" (p. 386). I think 
the answer to this question is that the moral life is so important that just as 
paternalism is justified in dealing with children and less-than-fully 
autonomous adults, self-induced leaps of faith (self-paternalism) in the 
interest of moral character and actions might be justified with regard to 
one' s self. 
Two minor points should be mentioned. First, Gale's humor graces his 
discussion throughout (there is a hilarious moment where he and Phil 
Quinn get into an argument regarding modal intuition polls of the Univer- 
sity of Notre Dame versus the University of Pittsburgh, p. 235 ft.), but 
occasionally it misfires (as when he jokes about killing British soccer fans, 
p. 155). Second, there is no bibliography, which would have helped in 
Philosophy of Religion 34: 185-187, 1993. 185 
locating sources. The footnote references do not make up for this 
deficiency. 
In the end Gale's case against Theism, impressive as some arguments 
are, is not as strong as he imagines. Process Theology or the possibility 
that God lacks "middle knowledge," would avoid his attack on the free- 
will defense. On Plantinga's view, Gale over-estimates the force of his 
insight that God could have created persons with better dispositions than 
he did (so that they would more likely freely choose the right). Since 
Gale's critique of the Ontological Argument rests upon his conclusion that 
the Modal Problem of Evil is an insuperable problem, even his critique of 
Plantinga's version of this argument is flawed. His critique of the Argu- 
ment from Religious Experience, which for the most part is cogent, 
nevertheless fails to distinguish between first person justification and third 
person justification and fails to place religious experience within the 
context of a whole world view. Finally, Gale's project is self-consciously, 
incomplete, not taking into consideration inductive types of arguments, 
such as the teleological argument and arguments from religious history. 
Not only are these arguments important in their own right, but together 
with the other arguments discussed, they may work together to make a 
cumulative case for theism, such as Swinburne has developed. Whether 
the cumulative case will ultimately be successful is still in question, and 
Gale's important work may be a contribution to the final answer, but the 
work itself, as Gale recognizes, is not that answer. 
In spite of these reservations Gale's book is a treasure of contemporary 
philosophy of religion. Closely and cogently argued, with wit and good- 
willed wile, it's Philonic provocations would have made the Scottish 
Skeptic proud. 
Louis P. Pojman 
Philosophy Department 
University of Mississippi 
University, MS 38677 
Mary Midgley, Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and Its Meaning. 
London and New York: Routledge, 1992, x + 239 pp. US$25.00 
In this solidification of her spring 1990 Gifford Lectures, Professor 
Midgley focuses upon a loose collection of writers who seek salvation in 
the scientific exploration of outer space. While she traces this curious 
obsession with salvific space travel back to the writings of J.B.S. Haldane 
and J.D. Bernal, she concentrates most of her critical attention upon more 
recent advocates, such as Freeman Dyson, Paul Davies, John D. Barrow 
and Frank J. Tipler. 
In some of their more fanciful dreams, these futuristic authors imagine 
that even the farthest reaches of space will be colonized by mechanical or 
computerized substitutes for human beings. Such human replacements will 
be needed to overcome the natural limitations of biological life. Envi- 
sioned as capable of replicating themselves without limit, these machines 
are expected to be enormously powerful. Not only will they be able to 
186 
mine almost boundless energy from the depths of black holes, they may 
even restructure the most fundamental forces of nature, thereby tiptoeing 
delicately around the predicted heat death of the universe. 
Professor Midgley accounts for the religious overtones of such prepos- 
terous space adventures in terms of human purpose. She is convinced that 
having a purpose need not presuppose any prior, conscious planning. After 
all, even if mammalian kidneys were produced by nothing more than 
blind, evolutionary pressures, they still can serve an important purpose by 
playing some crucial role in the overall functioning of an animal's body. 
For Midgley, no matter what their origins, things may serve a purpose if, 
like kidneys, they fall into place as parts of some larger structure, whole or 
pattern. Thus, by providing a special place for people, wild dramas of 
futuristic space exploration can supply a scientific purpose for human 
beings. Furthermore, since she believes that the human quest for salvation 
is essentially a struggle to find some significant role for people in the more 
comprehensive scheme of things, Midgley concludes that futuristic space 
epics also can offer the alluring promise of salvation. 
Although she provides specific objections against particular variations 
on the generally salvific theme of future space travel, Professor Midgley 
puts most of her effort into developing a broader analysis, extracting 
assorted story lines, motifs and underlying motivations common to all the 
variants. In particular, she claims that the limitless expanse of space 
symbolizes unbounded freedom. To escape the dismal, petty problems of 
contemporary life, futuristic dreamers are driven by an arrogant desire for 
unlimited power mixed with a touchingly human fear of death. The 
characteristic shape of their dreams grows from a surprising interplay of 
influences. The conviction that only humans are of genuine value comes 
from a perverse secularization of Descartes and Kant. A hefty dose of 
reductionism mixed with Darwinian evolutionary theory effectively strips 
the natural order of any sacred mystery or creative spontaneity, transform- 
ing organisms into little more than curious contraptions, assemblies of 
self-replicating chemical machinery. To quench the religious longing for 
something higher and nobler, a Lamarckian twist allows the reformulation 
of Darwin's directionless struggle for existence into a goal-oriented 
enterprise. A self-serving and narrow-minded pride in the achievements of 
science dictates that the perpetuation and advance of scientific understand- 
ing is the only goal sufficiently lofty to serve as the ultimate end for 
natural history. Latent positivism generates the conclusion that only purely 
objective investigators could ever hope to reach such ethereal heights of 
scientific truth. Thus, if so glorious a goal is ever to be attained, incurably 
subjective human investigators eventually must be supplanted by blood- 
lessly computerized, emotionless collectors of information. Sadly, then, in 
the final scheme of things, the intellectual frailty of human beings dooms 
them to a shabbily meager purpose in life. Their salvation consists merely 
in the humble realization that they are currently useful, though tragically 
flawed and ultimately disposable, servants of science. 
In the course of her critique, Professor Midgley traces a myriad of 
confusions and inconsistencies in this incoherent and deeply inhumane 
vision of the future. Though many of her observations are not new, she 
frequently finds strikingly effective ways of driving them home. Unfor- 
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tunately, in her attempt to maintain contact with a popular audience, she 
regularly abbreviates her arguments, compressing them to the point of 
obscurity. Typically, even her most crucial insights are only hastily 
sketched. As a result, instead of offering a polished exposition of settled 
analysis, this volume reads more like a preliminary exploration of promis- 
ing ideas. 
For readers who can overlook these stylistic shortcomings, Professor 
Midgley's fascinating, but peculiar choice of subject matter may prove 
disheartening. No doubt, she has targeted a deadly aspect of contemporary 
Western culture, the conviction that salvation lies in the promise of 
scientific or technological development. But in a society where people 
truly believe that better vaccines or fancier condoms will save us all from 
the social ravages of AIDS, in a world convinced that Stealth bombers can 
cauterize the injustices of ancient hatreds or that mass starvation can be 
eliminated simply by developing a few more potent pesticides or chemical 
fertilizers, it is difficult to share her passionate concern over the dangers 
posed by a small band of largely ineffectual dreamers. Surely, there are 
more insidious and immediately threatening manifestations of the contem- 
porary faith in the powers of science than this handful of escapist stories 
about future voyages into the depths of space. 
Edward L. Schoen 
Department of Philosophy and Religion 
Western Kentucky University 
Bowling Green, KY 42101 
David Ray Griffin, Evil Revisited Responses and Reconsiderations. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991, 277 pp. US$19.95 
paper; US$59.50 cloth. 
David Griffin has done more than anyone to defend and expand upon the 
answer to the problem of evil found in the writings of A.N. Whitehead and 
Charles Hartshome. Largely because of Griffin's first book on the subject, 
God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (1976), John Hick refers to 
process theodicy as one of "three main Christian responses to the problem 
of evil" (Philosophy of Religion 4th ed., p. 40). Evil Revisited is Griffin's 
response to criticisms of his earlier work. Almost all of Griffin' s critics are 
theists - Alvin Plantinga, Randall and David Basinger, Stephen Davis, 
Bruce Reichenbach, John Knasas, Nancy Frankenberry, Nelson Pike, John 
Hefner, John Hick, and Edward Madden and Peter Hare. In addition to 
responding to critics Griffin revises his theodicy to address what he takes 
to be deficiencies in his earlier presentations. 
Griffin's overarching purpose is to show that a process theodicy is 
superior to its rivals. His opening chapter is a lucid summary of his case 
against traditional answers to the problem of evil and for his own answer. 
The biggest change in Griffin's position where traditional theodicies are 
concerned is to explicitly acknowledge a difference between all-determin- 
ing theism (henceforth ADT) and free will theism (henceforth FWT). 
According to ADT God can single-handedly create any conceivable state 
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of affairs. FWT holds that God freely chooses to create some beings with 
free will whose activity the deity cannot completely control. An important 
reason for being clear about this difference is that FWT and process 
theism (henceforth PT) are logical contraries of ADT. Furthermore, fully 
half of the critics to whom Griffin responds accept FWT. 
There are three main differences between PT and FWT. First, PT 
proposes, as a metaphysical hypothesis, that every actuality has some 
power of self-determination. Hence, God cannot completely control any 
actual entity. FWT commits one to an ontological dualism in which some 
actual things have the power of self-determination and some do not. God 
can completely control the latter but not the former. The second difference 
is that PT maintains that God exerts power directly only on individuals 
and never directly on aggregates (Whiteheadian societies). FWT recog- 
nizes no distinctions in the beings on which God acts directly. Finally, PT 
posits as a necessary truth that there can be greater freedom if and only if 
there is greater opportunity for good and risk of evil. FWT can accept this 
correlation at the level of human freedom, but God alone determines the 
conditions for the possible realization of values in the nonhuman world. 
By clarifying these differences, Griffin is able to highlight the distinc- 
tiveness of PT and show its advantages for theodicy. For example, 
traditional theodicies (ADT and FWT) tend to view the nonhuman world 
as important only insofar as it contributes to "soul making" (Hick) in the 
human sphere. The aeons before humans existed, being unnecessary to 
soul making, are an embarrassment for this view. Furthermore, traditional 
theisms trivialize animal suffering. PT affirms the intrinsic worth of values 
in the nonhuman world. The millions of years of evolution, though 
necessary to produce human beings, were no mere prelude to humanity's 
appearance. Nonhuman animals are neither unimportant in their own right 
nor unnecessary to the achievement of specifically human values. 
Evil Revisited should end misunderstandings of PT such as the false 
identification of efficient and final causation with coercion and persuasion. 
Griffin's nuanced discussion is helpful in distinguishing the varieties of 
coercion and persuasion and explaining the senses in which the God of PT 
can and cannot coerce. In a metaphysical sense, to coerce is to unilaterally 
determine. Griffin argues that, in this sense, coercion only occurs between 
aggregates, between beings that lack all power of self-determination. For 
instance, my hand moves the pencil but neither is free. However, my 
control of my hand is not absolute. As Griffin notes, we are more or less 
coordinated. Our coercive power over other bodies is indirect, a result of 
our noncoercive power over our bodies. Unlike a localized creature God 
has no body that mediates influence on the environment. God exerts power 
over individuals within the universe but never on aggregates. If God has a 
body, it is the universe. Thus, God has no coercive power in this sense. 
Griffin refines his theodicy in two ways, one suggesting that things are 
worse than we thought and the other suggesting that things are better than 
we thought. First, he recognizes the existence of the demonic, "that which 
intensely opposes the Divine Creativity of the universe" (p. 31). The 
possibility of the demonic is inherent in PT's axiology, for opportunities 
for good and evil are correlative. Second, he argues that PT' s idea of being 
perfectly remembered by God (objective immortality) is not enough for 
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faith in the ultimate victory of good over evil. Objective immortality 
should be supplemented with a doctrine of personal survival of death. 
Griffin, who now believes in personal survival, says that the empirical 
evidence for it is "surprisingly impressive" (p. 39). He claims that a 
process theodicy without this doctrine is still superior to other theodicies. 
However, given his critique of objective immortality it is surprising that he 
views belief in survival as optional for PT. It is also unclear how personal 
survival of death strengthens any theodicy. Would the demonic be any less 
tenacious in the hereafter than in this life? 
Every theodicy is caught between the Scylla of compromising divine 
power and the Charybdis of compromising divine goodness. Griff'm 
navigates these difficult waters as well as anyone and better than most. His 
success is due in large measure to following his own advice about what 
one should expect from a theodicy. Against Plantinga he argues that 
theists should do more than reconcile the existence of God with the 
existence of evil. They should also strive to develop theodicies that are 
more adequate and illuminating than their competitors. Defensive and 
rearguard strategies are not enough. Process theodicy, embedded in a 
metaphysics that was deliberately constructed to take account of the best 
in science and culture, will continue to attract those who are open to new 
approaches and challenge those who defend time-honored traditions. 
Donald Wayne Viney 
Department of Social Science 
Pittsburg State University 
Pittsburg, KS 66762-5880 
Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992, 236 pp. £35.00 cloth; £12.95 paper. 
This is the second volume of a projected tetralogy dealing with philosophi- 
cal issues arising out of central Christian doctrines. It begins with a useful 
discussion of some general topics and distinctions related to language, 
expression, assertion, etc., and it ends with some provocative, and highly 
controversial, observations about the proper methods of biblical interpreta- 
tion. The major element in the book, however, is a long argument to 
defend the claim that the Christian faith is based on a genuine divine 
revelation - a "propositional" revelation, important truths divinely 
conveyed to the human race - and that this revelation is incorporated in 
the Bible and is authenticated and authoritatively interpreted by the 
Church. 
Readers familiar with Swinburne's work may recognize a characteristic 
style - an extended probabilistic argument, combining a pr ior i  and 
empirical elements. An initial appeal is made to Swinburne's earlier work 
on theism to establish a strong probability for the existence of God. Then 
there is an a pr ior i  speculation both about the desirability of a divine 
revelation as a guide to our supernatural end, and about what properties it 
would be good for such a revelation to have. Given the probability of 
God's existence, it is not highly improbable that there is such a revelation. 
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Empirical evidence to establish the reality of such a revelation, therefore, 
need only be moderately strong. 
So we come to the New Testament. We cannot initially claim any 
special status for it, and it may contain distortions of Jesus' life and 
message. Swinbume thinks, however, that some things are fairly clear. 
Jesus taught and preached some message or other. He undertook to found 
a continuing institution - the Church, a new Israel - whose first members 
were the twelve disciples. He instituted a liturgical observance, the 
eucharistic meal. And he allowed himself to be seized and unjustly 
executed in close conjunction with the Jewish celebration of the Passover. 
And then came a really big and decisive event, the resurrection of Jesus 
from the dead. 
Swinbume says that the resurrection of Jesus was bound to be inter- 
preted by his contemporaries as a divine stamp of approval on his teach- 
ing. And so, if this miracle actually happened then God must have in- 
tended it, at least in part, to have just that significance. So the resurrection 
would be an empirical confirmation of the claim that there was indeed a 
divine revelation. It would be God's own assertion, by a dramatic divine 
act, that Jesus indeed spoke for Him. 
Did the resurrection actually occur? Given the existence of God, 
miracles are not impossible, nor even highly improbable. But to get any 
further on this question we must have recourse to some empirical evidence 
- historical, testimonial, etc. Well, what about that evidence? I suppose 
that Swinbume thinks that the evidence for the resurrection is strong 
enough to generate some substantial positive probability. Otherwise, he 
would not write this book. But here, perhaps surprisingly, Swinburne 
declines to evaluate it, saying modestly "That is not my expertise." I'll 
return to this modesty shortly. 
Assuming that Jesus was resurrected, then, there was a divine revelation 
conveyed by Jesus' teaching. But a revelation which was intended for all 
mankind must be authenticated, preserved, propagated, put into the 
thought forms of diverse cultures, applied to new circumstances, and so 
on. How could this be done? No doubt this was to be the function (or one 
function) of the new institution which Jesus founded, the Church. And if 
the divine intention is to be fulfilled, then God must see to it that the 
Church performs this function well - perhaps infallibly, or if not, then at 
least reliably enough that the divinely provided information is sufficiently 
preserved, etc., to guide us into the Kingdom of God. So we have good 
reason to rely on the Church in its identification of the canon of the Bible, 
its judgment about the biblical authority, its formulation of the creeds as 
summaries of Christian doctrine, its interpretation of the Bible, and so on. 
Which Church? Well, maybe it doesn't matter much, since (according 
to Swinbume) the doctrinal agreements among the major Christian groups 
are much greater than the differences. But he also has some interesting 
observations about the criteria for determining which modem candidate is 
the "best continuer" of an ancient institution. Given the criteria, of  course, 
then we would need to apply them to the various candidates. But here 
again Swinburne declines this final step, leaving it to historians. 
So much for a sketch of the main argument, as I understand it. Here I 
will end with three more critical comments. 
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First, I suppose that when Swinburne came to speculate about a 
revelation, etc., he was already a Christian and he already had some ideas 
about what revelation was actual. I think that readers who are not Chris- 
tians may well suspect that his speculations on these matters are not 
entirely "pure," not guided simply by some universal canon of reason, but 
are to some extent tailored to fit his antecedent convictions. At any rate, it 
will be interesting to see to what extent Swinburne's argument here is 
convincing to outsiders. 
Second, is there not something deeply disturbing about Swinburne's 
reluctance to evaluate the historical evidence which is crucial to his own 
line of argument? Of course, he is not a historian. But isn't that just the 
problem? I am not a historian either. And the world is chuck-full of  people 
who are even less qualified to make historical judgments, or to choose 
among historians, than we are. Is it credible that a revelation intended for 
all mankind should depend on its recipients making historical judgments 
of this sort? And if I decline to make such judgments, then how can this 
line of argument be of any benefit to me? 
Third, Swinburne's whole approach, it seems to me, depends on the 
assumption that the divine revelatory activity, at least with respect to the 
really important truths, does not take place today. In fact, the assumption 
is that there has been no such divine revelatory act since the first century 
A.D. So we do not have the same access to the revelation which the first 
recipients had. (That is why, it seems to me, Swinburne thinks his line of 
argument is necessary.) Swinburne gives no reason for this assumption 
other than that is a part of  the tradition. But not all Christians accept this 
assumption, and the actual practice of the church seems to me to fit it very 
poorly. There is no space here to pursue this topic further, but I suggest 
that questioning this assumption would lead to a much different treatment 
of the topic of divine revelation. 
George I. Mavrodes 
Department of Philosophy 
The University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109 
Gordon E. Michalson, Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and 
Moral Regeneration. Cambridge: University Press, 1990, xii + 172 pp. 
US$ 39.95 
This book explicates four 'wobbles' which arise in reading Kant's 
Religion Within the Limits of  Reason Alone (Rel). All four problems arise 
from what Kant calls the radical evil in human nature. By that he means 
that we do not do evil by mistake (cf. Meno 77b-78b) or because of 
improper education (cf. Seneca and Rousseau), nor merely that we 
'perform actions that are evil' (Rel 16), but that we are fundamentally evil: 
opposed to the good in intention; in Kant's language, we have 'an underly- 
ing evil maxim' (Rel 16). What Michalson says of Kant in regard to the 
antinomies which arise due to such evil applies as well to Fallen Freedom: 
'We should be interested, not because of anything [he] finally claims 
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about evil or salvation, but because the sheer instability of his position is a 
telling indicator of the difficulties facing religious thought in our own day' 
(p. x). 
The first question Kant's contemporaries, notably Goethe, had about 
the Religion could be put thus: 'Why invent questions about radical evil at 
so late a date (after Rousseau and all the Enlightenment)?' That Goethe's 
distaste for the Religion is mentioned early (p. 17) and often (pp. 46, 48, 
49) is one indication that Michalson is historicising Kant and the problem 
Kant faces. But if evil is chosen, it is radical. If it is a mistake, or the result 
of bad education, it is not moral evil. Moreover, if history teaches some 
new means of salvation from evil, then not only were all previous 
philosophers theoretically mistaken, but also neither Plato nor Goethe, 
Rousseau nor Kant were the same kind of moral beings as we are in these 
post-Enlightenment days, for seeing how moral evil really comes to be 
makes us responsible for getting rid of it, where those other, less knowing 
men could not have been expected to do so. All that follows from Michal- 
son's historicizing suggestion 'that the instability in [Kant's] thinking is 
the inevitable result of a divided cultural inheritance - something which 
even a brilliant thinker like Kant could not clearly see, no matter how hard 
he looked. His difficulties are the difficulties of his historical setting rather 
than of philosophical argumentation' (p. xi). One of the difficulties facing 
religious thought in our day is precisely this one: whether the weight 
which the rails of history are made to bear by arguments like Michalson's 
is not significantly more than they actually do, or can bear. 
In part one, 'Radical Evil,' Michalson lays out Kant's view of radical 
moral evil in human nature as a signal document within the context of 'an 
ongoing referendum on the idea of "otherworldliness"' (1) in modem 
religious thought. Kant is, then, a test case for the question, 'to what extent 
can religion avoid an other-worldly reference?' Or, in more theological 
language, 'to what extent can one be a liberal theologian?' What one's 
own answer to that question is will dictate, if not the answer to the 
question 'is Kant a liberal theologian?' at least the answer to 'should he 
have been?' Michalson seems to assume that liberal theology poses the 
right questions, even if it does not provide adequate solutions. 
Michalson shows that Kant's strategy of limiting explanation to objects 
of sense and exhibiting reason as the source, if not the being, of the subject 
puts him in league with the purely this-worldly, natural and moral ac- 
counts of religion in liberal theology, but his claim that the good will 
suffices, though it effect nothing, and his practical postulates face him 
ahistorically and illiberally out of this world. He makes it clear that 'the 
issue [of evil] is deeply rooted in the structure of Kant's practical 
philosophy and in its tendency to move forward through the resolution of 
self-made antinomies' (p. 19), though he does seem to think that that 
antinomic structure, in the Religion, is a function of retrograde ghosts in 
the machinery of the West. Michalson develops four antinomies: (1) 
Humankind has an 'original predisposition to good' but a 'natural propen- 
sity to evil'; (2) Radical evil is 'innate' but 'brought upon us' by our own 
freedom; (3) We are morally obligated to deliver ourselves from radical 
evil, even though it is "inexterpible by human powers';  (4) We must 'make 
ourselves' good again, but divine aid 'may be necessary' to our actually 
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becoming good (p. 8, quoting Rel). 
The first two are the foci of the first part of the book; the second two of 
the second ('Moral Regeneration'). Michalson's summary statement that 
'moral evil itself is a property of the act of will that freely subordinates 
one incentive to another, the moral to the sensuous' (p. 35) is correct. But 
conjoining that statement to the first two wobbles makes it difficult not to 
read Kant as 'a despiser of the body'.  Michalson tries, but finally falls, to 
avoid that misinterpretation. He reminds us that natural predispositions - 
to animality, humanity, and personality - are good: 'inclinations, 
considered in themselves, are good' (p. 39, quoting Rel 51). Sed contra, 
his own remark: 'It remains true to say that Kant's moral philosophy 
continues the Platonic-Augustinian denigration of the body and the 
sensual - a codifying of the moral good in terms calling for the subordina- 
tion of, if not the total suppression of, what is physical and instinctual 
[although] he never flatly states that the body is bad' (p. 39). 
Respondeo, to make any moral claim at all is to say that some thing is 
better than another. This is not denigration unless either the particular 
moral claim is wrong, or the making of any moral claim at all is so, and 
that latter claim denigrates morality, unless there is no such thing. (In 
which case there is no such thing as denigration, there is only shifting of 
power.) As subordination and suppression are distinct, so too are denigra- 
tion and subordination. Insubordination always denigrates what it is 
insubordinate to, subordination does not necessarily do so, and when it 
does we call it suppression; but that kind of subordination cannot be 
inspired by Wille. 
So, too, saying 'the body provides freedom with the opportunity to go 
wrong' (p. 69) is no more correct than saying 'Wille provides freedom 
with the opportunity to go wrong',  for without the latter there is no moral 
freedom, but only animal voluntariness. That Michalson's wobbles lead 
him where they do in this regard is an indication that where he goes it is 
not necessary to follow. 
The serious problem for Kant, encompassing 'wobbles' 3 and 4 and the 
second part of Fallen Freedom, is how the radically evil moral agent 
becomes good. Again, where Michalson sees Kant caught in the slow 
machinery of the history of ideas - 'his awkward posture [is due to being] 
between a modem commitment to autonomy and a received tradition 
framed in terms of biblical imagery' (p. 89) - I think Kant is the modem 
version of a perennial problem. He is, then, not 'struggling to free himself 
from [biblical imagery] in order to do justice to [autonomy], but ... 
prevented from doing so by his own theory of radical evil' (p. 89f); rather 
he is indicating the lay of the land in the world of autonomously chosen, 
i.e., radical, evil. He is 'dealing with philosophical argumentation', he is 
not ' juggling centuries' (ct. 140). 
Despite this continued historicizing flaw Michalson is correct that 'the 
chief culprit producing [Kant's] conceptual turbulence is what we might 
call the "before and after" feature of the transition from radical evil to a 
renewed disposition' (p. 83). While he seems to give equal weight to the 
questions why would a radically evil moral agent change his disposition?, 
and how could he, the crux of the problem, given the permanent presence 
of Wille and the purely intelligible character of the disposition, is clearly 
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the latter. Wille provides the permanent motive, but how can there be 
change in a realm where before and after, i.e., time, is not applicable? 
The complex of problems spinning out from wobbles 3 and 4 can be 
gathered around the question 'How to attribute a persisting identity to the 
agent, considered as a free being' (p. 85); and in every move Kant 'call[s] 
into question the self-sufficiency of human autonomy' (p. 96). This is 
clearly a terrible problem for Kant, given the centrality of freedom in his 
philosophy, but it is also clearly not a problem that is imported by late- 
blooming dogmatic considerations, rather it is the fruit of Kant's mature 
thought about responsibility for both good ['the case of a righteous man' 
in the Critique of Judgement (KU 425f).] and evil. The Religion considers 
that last problem, and Michalson shows with great perspicacity how every 
move Kant makes from the morally corrupted position is checked, and 
only exacerbates an already impossible problematic. Atonement, for 
example, 'the payment of the surplus debt' for having been evil, is 
impossible. First, because whatever good we do is already only our duty, 
and secondly, because it 'requires a punishment, but the punishment itself 
entails a linkage between the moral and the temporal' (p. 116) namely, 
'that the change of heart involved in moral regeneration occur in time and 
enjoy temporal duration' (p. 115). That linkage, we know, is not allowed 
to speculation, for time is merely a condition of sensibility. 
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